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ABSTRACT
The theory of the archetypes and the collective unconscious are two of the most
typical topics of analytical Jungian psychology, on the one hand, and two of the most
controversial ones, on the other. In Jung’s view the archetypes are predispositions to patterns
of perception and behavior typical of all human being and the animal world. They have
evolved, according to Jung, evolutionary over the repeated history of re-experiencing similar
situations. Although Jung stressed that these were given to us a priori and seem to be innate,
he also pointed out that it is the form which is innate. Archetypes are autonomous from
consciousness, have a feeling value, and are unknowable to consciousness. We experience the
archetypes through their ability to organize experience and ideas. They manifest themselves
under the influence of the environment as representations in myths, fairy tales, dreams, art, as
well as in scientific ideas.
Contemporary Jungian scholars have proposed different ways of reinterpreting the
Jungian understanding of the archetypes in terms of contemporary science. Among the most
prominent reformulations is the understanding of the archetype as image schema in the
context of embodied cognition and enacted cognition. Furthermore, many scholars look at the
similarities between the dynamics of the archetype and the attractors in dynamic open systems,
thus suggesting that archetypes are attractors in the psyche as a system. Others direct their
attention to findings of complexity theory and the parallels to the non-linear dynamics of
archetypal processes. There still are also followers of the idea that archetypes are innate and
they are predispositions that we come with and result from the long process of evolution.
The review of some contemporary scientific findings in psychology and neuroscience
demonstrated that many of the observations of C. G. Jung concerning the theory of the
archetype and the collective unconscious find support in contemporary psychology as
phenomena.
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However, empirical research is still extremely sparse. The work of Rosen and Smith
(1991) and the research of Maloney (1999) were the first attempts to test empirically the
hypothesis of the archetypes of the collective unconscious. Maloney studied the preferences
of adults and demonstrated experimentally that adults showed preferences for pictures with
archetypal motifs. Rosen and Smith (1991) studied the association between archetypal
symbols and their related meanings and reached the conclusion that archetypal symbols and
their meanings were strongly associated and these associations were unconscious, which they
explained as a form of archetypal (collective unconscious) memory triggered into
consciousness as a result of priming.
The studies reported here build on the method of Rosen and Smith (1991) and
investigate the association between archetypal symbols and their related meanings in a cross-
cultural context.
The first study was a cross-cultural replication in German of the original work of
Rosen and Smith (1991). The results replicated the findings that archetypal symbols were
strongly associated to their meanings and that the nature of these associations was
unconscious. In this sense, the results support the assertions of Jung that archetypes are
universal in nature and demonstrate that the effect observed in the English studies of Rosen
and Smith is unlikely to be a cultural or linguistic artifact.
The second study investigated the nature of cognitive functioning of Chinese
characters (kanji). The study demonstrated that kanji behave on a cognitive level as archetypal
symbols and that there is a strong association between the graphic image of kanji and their
true meanings. The nature of this association is unconscious. Furthermore, these results lent
support to the theoretical speculations about the archetype as image schema in the context of
the embodied cognition approach to cognition.
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1ARCHETYPES OF THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS
Classical View
Unlike Freud, Jung believed that the unconscious was not just the seat of sexual and
aggressive instincts and repressed wishes. Through his work with the association experiment,
the study of myths and fairy tales, and the study of fantasy products of psychotic patients,
Jung reached the conclusion that there was a layer of the unconscious which contained
universal patterns of behavior and modes of perception that were accessible to the whole of
the human race and to the animal world, as well. These specific patterns of perception and
behavior which crystallize in consciousness in the form of symbols he named archetypes. In
Jung’s own words “Archetype is an explanatory paraphrase of the Platonic ϵίδος” (Jung, 1954, 
CW vol. 9-I, para. 5, p. 4). Jung quoted multiple earlier sources in which the term “archetype”
appeared (Jung, 1954, CW 9-I, para 5, p.4) to stress the fact that what he described by means
of this term could be qualified as “archaic…primordial types, that is, with universal images
that have existed since the remotest times” (Ibid, para. 5, p. 5). The repetition over thousands
of years of similar situations which “arouse affect-laden fantasies” (Jung, 1931, CW 8, para
334, p. 155) gave “rise to archetypes” (Ibid.) in Jung’s view. Archetypes are “a living system
of reactions and aptitudes” (Ibid., para 339, p. 157). As such Jung linked them to the instincts
– “archetypes are simply the form which instincts assume” (Ibid); they are the form of the
pattern of instinctual situations needed for the existence of the instinct. They can provide in
this sense the necessary link between the embodied experience of life and meaning (Jung,
1959). However, Jung cautioned that although archetype and instinct showed affinity, they
“were the most polar opposites imaginable” (Jung, 1954, CW 8, para 406, p. 206). Jung
believed that archetypes were “elements of spirit” which should not be identified with the
intellect (Ibid.).
2Archetypes in Jung’s understanding are predispositions and are as part of the
collective unconscious “in the brain structure of every individual” (Jung, 1931, CW 8, para
342, p. 158). However, Jung pointed out that archetypes were “empty, purely formal…a
possibility of representation given a priori” (Jung, 1954, CW 9-I, para 155, p.79). Further on,
he stressed that “the representations themselves are not inherited only the forms…” (Ibid.) In
this sense, Jung believed that the archetype-as-such was unknowable and “irrepresentable”
(Jung, 1954, CW 8, para 417, p. 213). We come to know the effect of archetypes through the
impact they have on consciousness due to their “ability to organize images and ideas” (Jung,
1954, CW 8, para 440, p. 231). The archetype in Jung’s view “can be named and has an
invariable nucleus of meaning – but always only in principle” (Jung, 1954, CW 9-I, para 155,
p. 80). Anything we say about the archetype remains a visualization which is made possible
by the current state of consciousness in a respective moment. Archetypes are numinous and
are associated with strong affective responses. “It would be an unpardonable sin of omission,
were one to overlook the feeling-value of the archetype” (Jung, 1954, CW 8, para 411, p.209).
They are autonomous from consciousness (Jung, 1954, CW 9-I, para 85, p. 40). “The
archetype is pure, unvitiated nature.” (Jung, 1954, CW 8, para 412, p.210) Jung explained the
use of the word nature as follows: “”Nature” here means simply that which is, and always was,
given” (Ibid., foot note)
Furthermore, Jung posited that the archetype had a “psychoid nature” (Jung, 1954,
CW 8, para 419, p.215). He clarified this as follows “the archetype describes a field which
exhibits none of the peculiarities of the physiological and yet, in the last analysis, can no
longer be regarded as psychic, although it manifests itself psychically” (Jung, 1954, CW 8,
para 420, p. 215).
So, archetypes-as-such, while being universal, are also unknowable or unconscious;
although archetypes have a profound impact on consciousness and the life of the individual.
They do not belong just to the psychic sphere and seem to be given a priori as a possibility or
3a form without content. They can be seen as predispositions to certain forms of organization
of perception and experience, and patterns of behavior, and encode the results of a long
process of repeated experience of similar situations over thousands of years.
There are many archetypes. The central archetype is the archetype of the Self. The Self
is the totality of the psyche and its circumvention. Stevens (2003) defined it as the archetype
of order.
The archetypes in Jung’s view have a substantial place in the structure of the psyche
and its dynamics. The psyche consisted of several layers according to Jung – consciousness
being the top-most, followed by the personal unconscious, and the bottom most one being the
collective unconscious.
(Diagram of the different psychic layers by C. G. Jung, Modern Psychology, 1959, vol. 2, p.194
1 - consciousness, 2 - the ego-complex, the center of consciousness, 3 - personal unconscious consists
mainly of personal memories, 4 – collective unconscious)
At the top of the pyramidal presentation of the psyche Jung placed the ego which in
his view was the center of consciousness around which the contents of consciousness were
organized. The personal unconscious consists of complexes which are clusters of ideas,
memories and experiences with a particular feeling tone. These are organized around an
archetypal core. Jung described the archetypes in this sense as “magnetic points” (Jung, 1959,
vol. 2, p.190) which attract experience. “The field of the archetype tends to get larger, as more
4and more impressions collect round it, it rises higher and higher, and when it touches the
surface (of consciousness – note MSK) it appears as a complex.” (Jung, 1959, vol. 2, p.191)
(Diagram psychic structure viewed from above by C. G. Jung, 1959 - Alchemy vol. 2, p. 138,
a – the field of consciousness with the ego-complex in the center and the associated to it
complexes, b – the field of the personal unconscious above which as an island rests
consciousness, contains complexes which are not integrated in consciousness, c – collective
unconscious,)
The more conscious the ego of a complex the better this complex is integrated in
consciousness (as the cluster of related circles in circle ‘a’ from the above diagram), the more
the ego looks away from a complex the more dissociated it is from consciousness. Each
complex has in Jung’s view an archetypal core since archetypes are those predispositions
which make the organization of experience possible and complexes can be looked at as forms
of episodic memory which encode personal experiences associated with a particular affect
(Huston, 1992). Furthermore, archetypes which are unknowable as such can be to a certain
extent accessed via the complex which in Jung’s view is the royal road to the unconscious
(Jung, 1948, CW 8, para 210, p.101).
5(Diagram which represents the collective unconscious (bottom most layer) and its
differentiation by C. G. Jung, 1959, vol. 2, p.115)
Although the above diagram was drawn by Jung to represent the collective
unconscious and its differentiation at the level of humanity, it also demonstrates the
differentiation of the unconscious on an individual conscious level. Thus complexes are
depicted as ‘islands’ of consciousness which at the core are connected to the archetypes from
the collective unconscious.
It is important to note that archetypes are related to the specific dynamics of psychic
life described by Jung and play an important role in healing. At times of crises it is suggested
that the archetypal landscape changes. The activation of an archetypal field is related also to
the experience of meaningful coincidences based on an a-causal principle called by Jung
synchronicity. The dynamics underlying archetypal processes are related to the psychic urge
to self-actualization inherent in the psyche as a self-regulating system called by Jung
individuation. “The process of individuation is founded on the instinctive urge of every living
creature to reach its own totality and fulfillment.” (Jung, 1959, Vol. 5, p.11) This is a life-long
process of unfolding the psychic potential of the individual and integrating it in conscious life.
6Contemporary Views
The last decades mark a new development in analytical psychology whereby
contemporary Jungian scholars try to reformulate the theory of the archetype in terms of
modern science.
Among one of the most well formulated modern approaches to the archetype is the
proposed reformulation of the archetype theory in terms of image schemas (Knox, 2003, 2004,
2009, Merchant, 2006, 2009, Sotirova-Kohli et al, 2011). Jean Knox first proposed the
connection between the image schema and the archetype-as-such. In the tradition of Talmy
(1983), Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1987) the image schema can be defined as a “dynamic,
recurring pattern of organism-environment interactions” (Johnson, 2007, p.136). They are
“structures of sensorimotor experience that can be recruited for abstract conceptualization and
reasoning” (Ibid., p.141). They are “preverbal and mostly nonconscious” (Ibid., p.144). In
this sense, image schemas are suggested to be a neural activation pattern which resulted from
repeated interactions between the individual and the environment (see Sotirova-Kohli et al,
2011). In this sense the archetype is looked at as an early achievement of development
resulting from the qualities of the brain as a dynamic system to self-organize and the
interactions between the individual and the environment (social, cultural and physical). This
understanding of the archetype uses a dynamic systems approach to the development of
cognition and action. This approach to cognition and action relates to the process of formation
of preverbal image schematic representations in the infants’ brain which are largely
determined by the history of the brain as a system, i.e. are based on the experience the system
has in the physical world and the ability of the brain as a dynamic system to self-organize
(Thelen and Smith, 1994). Later on, these pre-verbal neuronal activation patterns serve as a
foundation for the development of conceptual thought – categories and concepts. In
themselves these neuronal activation patterns constitute attractor states for the dynamic
system of the brain (see also Appendix B). Furthermore, the ideas of Talmy, Johnson and
7Lakoff concerning image schema find support in the contemporary research on embodiment
where embodiment is defined as the meaning of symbols to an agent and the reasoning about
meaning and sentence understanding which “depends on activity in systems also used for
perception, action and emotion” (de Vega, Glenberg & Graesser, 2008, p.4). Neuroimaging
studies support the idea that sensory and motor systems are involved in concept understanding
and retrieval (Binder & Desai, 2011). Thus, image schemas can be understood as the neuronal
activation patterns which encode embodied experience in the world, they function
automatically, i.e. unconsciously, and underlie concepts, narrative and ritual (Hampe, 2005),
all qualities which can be attributed also to the archetypes. It is important to note that in
Johnson’s (2007) theory of image schema and embodiment, feeling and emotion are attributed
an important role in the assessment and evaluation of the environment and in meaning-
making.
Relevant to the idea of the archetype as an image schema is also the contemporary
understanding of the inner world as a simulated interaction with the environment at the core
of which is the understanding that the phenomenal experience of an inner world is a result of
the ability to activate motor and sensory structures suppressing the urge to act (e.g. Heslow,
2011). The inner world of the human being is given central place in Jung’s work. Fantasy as a
form of simulation is also central in Jungian analytic work and related to the archetypal
dynamics at work which promote healing and integration of the personality. This specific
form of fantasy work, of imagination Jung called active imagination and defined it as “his
method of psychotherapy” (Chodorow, 1997, p. 17).
Another contemporary understanding of the archetype was formulated by George
Hogenson (2009) who proposed understanding the archetype as an “elementary action pattern”
(Hogenson, 2009, p.325). His ideas were provoked by the discovery of the mirror neurons and
are related to the ideas of Knox cited above. Although he did not make the connection
explicitly his ideas are also close to the enacted cognition approach to cognition and action
8proposed by Varela, Thomson and Rosch (1991). The above authors suggested that cognition
was “enaction: a history of structural coupling that brings forth a world” (Varela et al, 1991, p.
172) and that “the cognitive system projects its own world, and the apparent reality of this
world is merely a reflection of internal laws of the system” (Varela et al., 1991, p. 172).
Other Jungian scholars orient their re-interpretation of the theory of the archetype on
the basis of complexity theory. In this approach the non-linear dynamics which underlie some
aspects of the archetype as a field, related to, for example, synchronicity, enantiodromia (the
emergence of an unconscious position which compensates conscious one-sidedness) or the
therapeutic relationship as a dynamic open system, are stressed. George Hogenson proposed
that the archetype could be understood as an “iterative moment in the self-organization of the
symbolic world” (Hogenson, 2005, p. 279). Saunders and Skar suggested that the archetype
was an emergent structure which derived from the self-organizing properties of the brain
(basically not contradicting the theory of the image schema) (Saunders and Skar, 2001).
McDowell stressed that the archetype was a pre-existing principle of organization of the
personality (McDowell, 2001), while van Eewynk looked at archetypes as strange attractors
of the dynamic system of the psyche (van Eewynk, 1991, 1997) whose non-linear dynamics
underlie individuation – the process of conscious unfolding the potential of the personality
(similar to Maslow's idea of self-actualization) and the therapeutic relationship (see also
Appendix A). Furthermore, the notion of synchronicity - meaningful coincidences based on
an a-causal connection principle, which Jung developed in exchange with Wolfgang Pauli and
Albert Einstein, and which can be seen as an expression of a constellated archetypal field at
work (Jung, 1952, Cambray, 2002), finds support more recently through the discoveries in
complexity theory and the dynamics of complex adaptive systems (Cambray, 2009) and
supports the hypothesis that archetypes are attractor states in the psyche as a complex
adaptive system (Sotirova-Kohli et. al, 2011).
9Roesler (see appendix C) proposed that archetypes were not innate, but rather based on
a very small set of innate mechanisms which made certain experience and interactions with
the environment possible. This basic experience, however, did not need to be a result of the
personal experience of the individual, but could also be transmitted in the interactions as a
result of the work of mirror neurons. Furthermore, Roesler proposed that the link between the
archetype as a basic experiential structure and the archetype as symbolic representations was
provided by the narrative (see Appendix C).
Most of the above contemporary approaches to the archetype, however, look at it as a
psychic achievement in the process of development relying on the nature of the brain as a
dynamic system to self-organize and a small set of innate mechanisms such as the ability of
the newly born infant to concentrate on the face of the primary care-giver. How can
innateness be understood today?
Many believe in the obsoleteness of the discussion nature vs. nurture and stress the
interactionist nature of human development (Knox, 2004, Hogenson, 2009, Merchant, 2009,
Rosen et al., 2010, Roesler, 2010, 2012) or point out the psychological factors in evolution in
the argumentation against a purely genetically transmitted innateness (Hogenson, 2001) (see
also Appendix A). The innate aspect of the archetype is looked at as a predisposition to a
genetic condition which needs certain environmental cues to find expression in the sense of
epigenetics as described by Roesler (2010, 2012) (Rosen, personal communication). Jungian
scholar Pietikanen (1998) suggested a radical departure from the discussion about innateness
and proposed that with the help of Cassirerian approach archetypes could be understood as
“culturally determined functionary forms organizing and structuring certain aspects of man’s
cultural activity” (Pietikanen, 1998, p. 325).
There are Jungian scholars who find arguments in defense of the innateness of the
archetype from contemporary research. Among these are such phenomena as the doctor-
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patterns (Stevens, 2003), basic emotions, language acquisition mechanisms and the face
recognition program (Roesler, 2010, 2012); we can also add the basic affective systems as
proposed by Panksepp (e.g. 2011). Roesler (2012) pointed out Seligman’s concept of
“preparedness” – the readiness to learn – as a further example of innateness that could be
applied to archetypal theory. Erik Goodwyn (2010, 2012) used in defense of innateness
findings from evolutionary psychology and neuroanatomy. However, even scholars like
Anthony Stevens, known for their work in defense of genetically transmitted innateness, look
at the archetype-as-such as “innate neuropsychic centers” (Stevens, 2003, p. 86) thus getting
very close to the position of the earlier described understanding of the archetypes-as-such in
terms of embodiment and enacted cognition.
John Haule (2011) used multiple research evidence in defense of the position that
archetypes were “typical emotional bodily states” (Haule, 2011, p. 259) and basically in his
reformulation also did not differ from the positions of embodied and enacted cognition
described above. Maybe the major difference between these groups of Jungian scholars is the
degree to which the archetype is seen as an early developmental achievement or an innate
predisposition. The question is the extent to which these neuropsychic structures (to use the
words of Stevens) that also reflect certain “emotional bodily states” (in the words of Haule)
are biologically determined or result from the interactions with the environment – physical
and social.
It seems fair to say that the controversies concerning innateness and the archetype
reflect the controversies surrounding the topic of innateness in psychology at large. While the
dynamic systems approach to the development of cognition and action, cognitive semantics,
embodiment, and enacted cognition as approaches in the study of cognitive processes enjoy
widespread popularity, there are also many scholars who conduct experimental work in
connection with innate mechanisms (see also Appendix A). The experimental work of
developmental psychologists such as Spelke, for example, provides data which supports the
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hypothesis of multiple innate mechanisms with which infants are equipped at birth (Spelke,
2010, 2009). It, thus, seems that cognitive science at large has not answered the question
concerning innateness as a basic ideological factor.
Are archetypes innate or acquired? Archetypal psychology, a further group of Jungian
scholars, proposes that the very question of innateness is irrelevant and places the archetypes
in imagination, stressing their transcendental nature (see Roesler, 2010, 2012). Although this
approach to the archetype might not resonate with many main stream psychologists, there are
tendencies in contemporary studies of consciousness which sound in unison with the ideas of
archetypal psychology. The Hameroff and Penrose quantum theory of consciousness
(Hameroff and Penrose, 2003), the idea that consciousness “emerges as natural processes”
that involve quantum phenomena “unfold” (Satinover, 2001, p.219), and the hypothesis that
the brain does not produce consciousness but serves the purpose of receiving and transmitting
information which exists beyond it (Beauregard, 2011) can be seen to resonate with some of
the basic ideas of archetypal psychology concerning the archetype (see also Appendix A).
Scientific Status of the Concept of the Archetype (Appendix C)
As mentioned earlier the notion of the archetype was controversial from the very
beginning. Jung himself struggled with the idea going through different stages of its
formulation. Some of his formulations sound confusing and contradictory at first sight (see
Appendix C). However, what is the status of this idea at present time? What is the
compatibility of the theory of the archetype with scientific findings today?
The theory of the archetype concerns perception, experience and behavior. The basic
assertion in this respect is, as pointed out above, that these are influenced/organized/made
possible by mechanisms/modes that seem to be innate and universal and function
automatically, i.e., are basically non-conscious. The first evidence for the existence of a small
number of thematic cores around which experiences of individuals are organized was
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provided by the work of Jung and his followers with the Word Association Test, as mentioned
above. Recent neuroimaging study of participants involved in taking the Word Association
Test have demonstrated the neuronal activation pattern that underlies an activated complex
(Bechtel, 2013), thereby providing evidence for the neural correlates of the processes at work
that cause a disturbance of consciousness when a complex is triggered and supporting Jung’s
assertions.
Jung invested much effort in comparing motifs from religion, art and mythology to
demonstrate the recurrence of certain motifs which for him was further evidence for the
existence of universal archetypal modes of perception and behavior.
Do these assertions of Jung hold the test of time? Today, longitudinal studies of
fantasies produced under the influence of LSD demonstrate that there are a fixed number of
recurrent motifs in the fantasies of different individuals which in their nature agree with some
of the archetypal motifs described by Jung (see Appendix C). The comparative study of myths
and fairy tales from all over the world demonstrated as well that these earliest narratives deal
with topics which are strikingly similar, often also for cultures that are remote and isolated
from one another (see Appendix C). The structural similarities between the earliest narratives
and kinship of different cultures, was also studied and stressed by structural anthropologists
such as Claude Levi-Strauss. Thus we can say that Jung’s view of recurrent mythological
motifs which supported the hypothesis of universal archetypes also finds support in the work
of contemporary scholars (see Appendix C).
Over the years the understanding of innateness in connection with the theory of
archetypes has undergone changes together with the changing understanding of the role
played by genes and their functioning in the transmission of hereditary information. Today
most Jungian scholars search for support of the notion of innateness in basic psychic
mechanisms for which there is empirical evidence that infants come to this world equipped
with (as stated earlier). Among these can be mentioned the innate mechanisms of language
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acquisition, rudimentary perceptual and behavioral programs with which infants are equipped
at birth and attachment patterns, as well as universal basic emotions which can be found in
infants all over the world, as pointed also earlier (see Appendix C), or the basic affective
systems as defined by Jack Panksepp (Vandekerckhove & Panksepp, 2011). In this respect the
work of the affective neuroscientist Jack Panksepp is particularly interesting for Jungian
scholars since many of the assertions he makes sound in agreement with Jung’s assertions
about the archetypes, even though Panksepp nowhere explicitly makes association with the
theory of the archetype. Panksepp investigated the by him so-called primary affective systems
which humans shared, in his view, with other animals and constituted a part of the
mammalian brain in the subcortical regions. He stressed the necessity to “consider the layered
levels of human information processing “(Ibid., p. 2018) when taking into consideration the
neural correlates of psychic states and processes. Thus, for example, he pointed out that while
the neural correlates of higher cognitive functioning were to be found in the activation mode
of the neo-cortex, cognitive neuroscience in its research should not ignore the work of the
basic affective systems in relation to the higher cognitive processes. Furthermore, he believed
that “affective experience may reflect a most primitive form of consciousness (Panksepp,
2000b, 2004b), which may have provided an evolutionary platform for the emergence of more
complex layers of consciousness” (Panksepp, 2005, p.32). This statement is an excellent
reformulation in more contemporary language of the idea of Jung about the collective
unconscious and its evolutionary origin. Panksepp defined the primary-process affective
consciousness as “a gift of nature rather than an acquired skill” (Ibid. p.30), similar to the
assertion of Jung that archetypes were pure nature, although Panksepp pointed out himself
(Vandekerckhove & Panksepp, 2011) that there was not convincing evidence to demonstrate
how these processes were encoded genetically. He pointed out, however, that this possibility
could not be excluded completely. Panksepp stated that he “explores the possibility that basic
emotional feelings — a primary process type of phenomenology — may be grounded on
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instinctual action systems that promote unconditional emotional behaviors. Although such
‘‘ancestral voices of the genes’’ (Buck, 1999, p. 324) undergo a great deal of elaboration
epigenetically, the fundamental similarity of core affective processes across mammalian
species may permit neuroethological work on animal-models to reveal the bedrock of human
consciousness” (Panksepp, 2005, p. 31).
These ideas of Panksepp are particularly interesting for Jungian scholars since they
resonate with Jung’s assertions of the evolutionary base of consciousness provided by the
collective unconscious and the archetypes, the innateness of the archetype as a predisposition
to a pattern of behavior and perception related to instinct, the stress on the feeling-value of the
archetype, and the relatedness of the human psyche through the archetypes of the collective
unconscious to other animals.
Returning to the discussion about innateness, proponents of archetypal innateness
seem to agree in different ways on understanding innateness as some basic psychic
mechanisms which predispose us to react, feel and experience in distinctly human ways, as
Jung said. Jung himself stressed the innateness of the archetype-as-such but only as an empty
form or predisposition and explained the symbolic representation of the archetype-as-such in
consciousness as determined by the state of consciousness at the respective moment, as
pointed out above. One of the major reasons why archetypes were discussed in connection to
genes was that earlier scholars believed they were able to explain in this way the universal
character of the archetypes. Recent findings, however, have demonstrated the influence of the
environment that can lead to modifications of genetic and biological structures (see Appendix
C). Thus genetic transmission as a source of explanation of the universality of the archetype is
also put in question.
The new discoveries in neuroscience are an object of great interest to Jungian scholars
as has been pointed out. The qualities of the brain as a dynamic system to self-organize, the
properties of the neural networks to exhibit deterministic chaotic behavior on different levels
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of self-organization, the quantum moment in their functioning in this respect (Satinover,
2001) provide support for Jungian ideas related to the archetype.
A discovery which prompted much discussion among Jungian scholars was the mirror
neurons. These were seen as a possible mechanism related to the existence of the archetype by
Hogenson (2009), as already mentioned. Recently, Roesler (2012) proposed an understanding
of the collective unconscious based on the understanding of the mirror neuron system as a
form of memory which made possible the “subliminal, unconscious transmission of complex
information from one generation to the other” (Roesler, 2012, p. 241). Furthermore, he quoted
the ideas of Bauer (see Roesler, 2012) that mirror neurons contributed to the development of a
“shared intersubjective space” in which all typically “human sequences of actions and
experiences can be activated and communicated pre-verbally” (Bauer as quoted by Roesler,
2012, p. 241), and proposed that such a shared intersubjective space could be taken as a
neuroscientific reformulation of Jung’s hypothesis of the collective unconscious (Ibid.).
Experimental research in psychology also provides evidence for the existence of stable
patterns of perception organization which seem to function automatically and thus
unconsciously as Jung proposed the archetypes did. Empirical research in the field of Gestalt
psychology demonstrated the ability of the cognitive system to build “stable configurations of
perception” (Roesler, 2012, p.236). The theory of the prototype of Rosch (e.g. 1975, 1999)
and the theory of enacted cognition (already mentioned) look at categorization as a basic
function of living organisms whereby perception is organized in a particular way (Rosch,
1999, p.61). On the basis of her empirical investigations Rosch reached the conclusion that
categories were a graded structure whereby the judged best representative of the category was
called prototype (Ibid.). Furthermore, Rosch defined prototypes as “rich, imagistic, sensory,
full-bodied mental events” (Ibid., pp. 65-66) which were context dependent and reflected a
basic functioning of the mind connected with organizing perception rather than fixed
representations. She connected her idea of the prototype with the ideas of Johnson and Lakoff
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of the image schema and stated that these were “consonant with the view of cognition as
enaction” (Rosch, 1991, p. 178). The above ideas reflect in different ways Jung’s observations
of the complexes and their relation to the archetype as a central core. As Saunders and Skar
(2001) wrote, the archetype could be looked at as a “class of complexes which are considered
to fall in the same ‘category’” (Saunders and Skar, 2001, p.312). Defined in this way the
archetype seems to exhibit similarities to Rosch's notion of the prototype.
Thus although there are many aspects of the archetype theory which are open to
investigation and many open questions concerning the hypothesis of the collective
unconscious and the theory of the archetype, we can say that contemporary psychological
science, although using a different language, states ideas which resonate with some of the
observations of Jung concerning the theory of the archetype.
Given all these ideas how do we understand the archetype? Are archetypes transmitted
biologically or are they transmitted by culture as Roesler (2012) asks? Can we understand the
collective unconscious in terms of subliminal transmission and inter-individual neuronal
format as Roesler (2012) proposed or is the collective unconscious a form of archetypal
(collective unconscious) memory as Rosen et al. (1991) suggested?
While the above developments in psychology provide much space for thought and are
highly intriguing from a Jungian perspective, there still is no experimental evidence that
would support or reject the assertions such as that the archetype could be reformulated in
terms of image schemas, prototypes or enacted cognition.
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EMPIRICAL STUDIES
Contemporary empirical investigation of the hypothesis of the archetypes is sparse.
There are two experimental paradigms which aim to test the hypothesis of the archetype,
namely, the Rosen and Smith (1991) paradigm which will be described below and the
Maloney (1999) paradigm. Maloney studied the preference ratings of images presenting
archetypal themes such as the theme of the hero and the Mother in a large community sample
and found that archetypal themes determined affective responses of adults as hypothesized by
Jung's theory of the archetypes.
The Rosen and Smith paradigm was built on the basis of studying the associations
between a set of 40 archetypal symbols and their associated meanings – the Archetypal
Symbol Inventory (ASI). C. G. Jung conducted psychological evaluations of patients using
the Word Association Test as mentioned previously and this was one of his approaches for
studying the archetype (Roesler, 2010). Interestingly, as Rosen et al. (1991) pointed out, Jung
never used symbols in his association experiments. To provide an instrument with which
archetypal memory can be studied by means of symbols, the above authors developed the
Archetypal Symbol Inventory (ASI) which consists of 40 archetypal symbols and 40
associated words indicating the archetypal meanings of these symbols (Rosen et al., 1991).
Furthermore, Rosen and Smith designed a series of three experiments to test the hypothesis of
collective unconscious memory. The two preliminary experiments – a free association task
and a forced association task using the 40 symbols from the ASI – tested to what degree the
participants had spontaneous conscious knowledge of the archetypal meanings of the symbols
and provided empirical evidence that there is practically no conscious knowledge of these
meanings (Rosen et al., 1991).
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In their main study Rosen et al. (1991) investigated the learning effect and recall rate
of the 40 archetypal symbols and their related meanings from the ASI. The experimental
design of Rosen et al. (1991) utilized a cognitive psychological approach to testing the
hypothesis of the collective unconscious (memory). Rosen and coworkers hypothesized that
pre-existing collective unconscious memory would have qualities similar to “semantic
memory” (Tulving, 1972). The authors further adopted a list-learning procedure to test for
pre-existing knowledge of archetypal symbols. This procedure presupposes that participants
are presented with lists of stimuli (often pairs of words) to be learned and later their memory
of the learned stimuli was tested by showing only one of the words from the learned pair (the
cue). There is empirical evidence which suggests that words are learned better if they are cued
by semantically related words (e. g., Thomson and Tulving, 1970, Koriat & Bjork, 2005). The
experimental design of Rosen and team utilized the list-learning procedure where the stimuli
pairs consisted of a symbol and a word and, later, a cued-recall (archetypal symbols used as
cues) task was used to test the memory of the items from the learning procedure. Thus, the 40
archetypal symbols from the Archetypal Symbol Inventory (ASI) were presented to the
participants, one half of them were paired with their associated meanings and in the other half
with random incorrect meanings. The participants were later shown the symbol and were
asked to recall the word they saw previously paired with the symbol. As hypothesized, the
study found that the archetypal meanings were recalled better when in the learning phase they
were presented matched with the symbols they were associated with, i.e. when correctly
matched in the learning phase. This allowed the authors to conclude that the archetypal
symbols and their associated meanings were strongly associated. Since in their preliminary
studies the authors found that there was no spontaneous conscious knowledge of the meaning
of the symbols they concluded that the effect they observed in the main study of the paradigm
demonstrated pre-existing knowledge of the symbols which was triggered through an effect of
priming when the symbols were presented to the participants paired with their correct
19
archetypal meanings. This first study of Rosen et al. (1991), as well as subsequent studies of
Huston (1992) and Huston et al. (1999) provided empirical support for the existence of what
these authors called archetypal, collective unconscious memory. The findings were replicated
also by Bradshaw and Storm (2013).
Subsequently, Huston et al. (1999) proposed a possible mechanism for evolutionary
collective unconscious (archetypal) memory. They explained the effect of better recall of
meanings when they were matched correctly with a symbol as being a result “of
interhemispherical connection, mediated by the corpus callosum, which allows for the recall
of the accurate meaning of the archetypal symbol triggered by the affective response” (Huston
et al., 1999, pp. 145 – 146). According to these authors the right hemisphere was the seat of
archetypal patterns, symbols and their affectively charged visual images, while the left
hemisphere was the seat of verbal knowledge. It was proposed that when an archetypal
symbol was presented, matched with its correct meaning, there was an affective response
which constellated an archetypal image in the right hemisphere. This was explained as the
effect of priming the evolutionary unconscious archetypal memory. The authors further
suggested that it was this affective response which facilitated retrieval of the correct meaning
(word) of the symbol when the symbols were presented by themselves later in the cued recall
task (Huston et al, 1999).
The Rosen et al. study stimulated discussions among Jungian scholars. Jill Gordon
(Gordon, 1991) raised the question as to whether the images used by the team could at all be
considered to be archetypal before conducting cross-cultural research. Gordon stressed the
importance of conducting multiple cross-cultural studies to determine whether the images
used really had the qualities of archetypal images, namely, whether these were “forms that
provoke more or less similar or even identical associations from a majority of people”
(Grodon, 1991, p. 229). Raya Jones argued in a similar fashion that the results observed by
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Rosen et al. could be explained with “cultural convention or as artifacts of the statistical
procedure (Jones, 2003, p. 707).
Cross-cultural evidence of collective unconscious memory (see Appendix A)
Intrigued by the question if the results observed by Rosen and team described
previously are replicable in a different language and in a different cultural context we decided
to conduct the same experiment in the German-speaking part of Switzerland. We presumed
that if the significant effect of matching on learning and recall of the associated meanings of
archetypal symbols from the Archetypal Symbol Inventory (ASI) observed by Rosen and
team (1991) was related to the archetypal nature of the symbols used in the experiments then
these results should be replicable in cross-cultural studies conducted in a different language
and a different cultural context. Thus we hypothesized that correctly paired archetypal
symbols and their German associated meanings would also lead to significantly better
learning and recalling the associated words than in the case of mismatched pairs.
As a first step for testing the hypothesis, our team translated the original English ASI
into German. For this purpose the team of Sotirova-Kohli, Roesler and Opwis translated
individually the 40 items from English to German and through a process of inter-rater
agreement where all three agreed on the translation determined the German translations of the
40 symbols. An external expert from the Baumann Foundation (Basel) was asked to proofread
the translations as well. The question as to the adequateness of the procedure of attaching a
“correct meaning” to the symbols was discussed. However, the main idea of the present study
was to test the hypothesis of replicability of the results from the initial Rosen et al (1991)
study in a different cultural and linguistic context; it was agreed, therefore, to apply the
exactly same procedure for the experiment.
The participants in this experiment were 398 first and second year medical students
from the University of Bern and 14 psychology students from the University of Basel.
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Students were assigned randomly to the two counterbalancing conditions. Ten protocols were
excluded from the analysis due to systematic mistakes or for not filling out the protocols
properly.
We utilized the same experimental procedure as Rosen and Smith (1991) in their
original main study. The 40 symbols were divided in two sets of 20 symbols and each set was
presented to both of the counterbalancing conditions. However, in one condition they were
matched correctly with the associated meanings while in the other one they were mismatched.
The pairs were presented first for five seconds each and after a rest of one minute the symbols
were presented in the same order for eight seconds each in which time the participants were
asked to remember and write down the word they saw originally paired with the symbol.
The protocols were coded strictly. A repeated – measures factorial ANOVA was
conducted with one within-subjects variable (matching) and one between-subjects variable
(counterbalancing). The main effect of matching was significant, F (1, 401) = 125.83, p
< .001, MSE = 3.047, ω2 = 0.22; statistically significantly more meanings were recalled for
matched pairs than for mismatched pairs. Matching the symbols with their correct meanings
benefitted the learning and the subsequent recall. These results replicated the findings of
Rosen and team (1991) done in a sample of English speaking students. Being able to replicate
the findings that matching symbols correctly with their meanings facilitates learning and
subsequent recall in a German speaking sample provides further evidence that archetypal
symbols are truly associated with their meanings. Furthermore, this cross-cultural evidence of
the associations between archetypal symbols and their meanings demonstrates that it is less
likely that the observed effect is related to a cultural context or is a linguistic artifact. In this
sense, it can be said that our results provide further evidence that the collective unconscious
and archetypes as hypothesized by C. G. Jung have a universal nature.
We conducted analysis as well of the individual items of the ASI following the model
of Rosen et al. (1991) (see appendix A). Our intention was to compare the ranking of the
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symbols in our study to the ranking which symbols had in the original study. Through
calculating an ASI Index for each symbol Rosen and team demonstrated that not all symbols
were equally useful in their study. Although there was a partial overlap of the ranking of items
in both the Rosen et al. (1991) study and our German-speaking study, such as having the
symbols for power (Macht), unity (Einheit), birth (Geburt), masculine (Männlich) and
protection (Schutz) rank among the top third of the ASI index as best recalled when in the
matched condition, there were also notable differences. Surprisingly, symbols like the ones
for soul (Seele) and feminine (Weiblich) dropped into the lowermost third of the ranking in
the German study while ranking in the topmost third in the US study. Similarly, the symbol
for ascent (Aufstieg) that ranked highest in the rank-order of the US ASI study was in the
lower end of the middle group of the rank-order in the German study. The ranking of the
symbols in the German study was topped by the symbol of wrath (Zorn). The observed
differences can possibly be explained with the different contexts of the samples in the two
studies, i.e. socio-cultural factors, as well as immediate context in which the groups were at
the time of the experiment might have exerted influence on the results.
In addition, after the experiment was over, participants were asked to fill out a 4-item
subjective report. The questions were as follows:
1. Were any of the image-word pairs familiar to you already before the experiment? If
yes, which ones?
2. Among the image-word pairs were there ones that you found particularly intriguing? If
yes, which ones?
3. Did you use any particular strategy to be able to better learn the image-word pairs? If
yes, what was it?
4. Do you have any other comments about the experiment?
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184 participants in CB1 and 108 participants in CB2 indicated that they did not know
any of the image-word pairs used in the experiment before taking part in it. Among the rest
of the participants in both groups there were participants who listed both matched and
mismatched pairs as already familiar. To control for previous conscious knowledge of the
pairs listed by the participants in their subjective report, we identified and excluded from the
analysis all correct answers which corresponded to the pairs listed by the respective
participants as familiar from before the experiment. The data were then reanalyzed. There was
no change in the results. The effect of matching on learning and recall was still significant, F
(1, 401) = 55.78, p < .001. Thus we can say that even after controlling for previous
knowledge the appropriate matching of the symbols with the associated meaning benefited
learning and subsequent recall of the words and the associations were not considered to be
consciously familiar by the participants.
Almost all pairs – both matched and mismatched, in both groups were listed by some
participants as intriguing. Some participants indicated that the intriguing pairs were the ones
that they listed as familiar. These answers are particularly interesting since they raise the
question about the subjective experience of the participants during the experiment and the
personal associations of participants. While this was outside the scope of the present study it
would prove worthwhile investigating in subsequent studies.
41 participants in CB1 and 12 participants in CB 2 answered that they used no strategy
in learning the pairs in the experiment. However, many participants listed a number of
strategies they used to better learn the image-word pairs. Among these the most common ones
were: making associations between image and word (mentioned by 71 participants in CB1
and 48 in CB2), constructing stories/sentences with the image and the word (named by 61
participants in CB1 and by 74 participants in CB2), building associations to previous
experiences or known facts (given by 23 participants in CB1 and 18 in CB2), finding a
personal meaning or associating to a personal memory (memory aid) (by 12 people in CB1
24
and 14 in CB2), connecting image and word with emotions (named by 2 people in CB1 and 5
in CB2), and constructing scenes or pictures with the image and the word (listed by 13 people
in CB1 and 9 in CB2). It is of particular interest that participants noted the use of personal
experience or associations related to the image word pairs, as well as emotion.
Among the more common remarks about the experiment were suggestions for
improvement of the experimental design such as including numbers on the slides with the
images in the second part, showing the image-word pairs on the screen longer, and reducing
the number of images. Some included comments concerning the fit of image and word (these
did not fit together) or mentioned being able to recall the associations but not the words.
These remarks are not surprising and demonstrate the difficulty which the experiment
presented for the participants.
The cross-cultural study of the associations between archetypal symbols and their
meanings in a German-speaking sample of Swiss students, replicated the findings of Rosen et
al. (1991) and demonstrated that there is a highly significant effect of matching on learning
and subsequent recall of words correctly matched with the archetypal symbols whose
meaning they represent. These results support the hypothesis that archetypal symbols in the
collective unconscious and their meanings are truly associated. The fact that even after
excluding the pairs which were listed by the participants as familiar from before the
experiment the effect of matching on learning and recall was still highly significant supports
the hypothesis that the associations between symbols and their meanings are not conscious.
Furthermore, our results speak in favor of the universality of the archetype proposed by C. G.
Jung and suggest that the observed effect is less likely to be due to cultural influence or
linguistic artifacts. The differences in the rank-order of the archetypal symbols in the US
study and the Swiss-German study suggest that it is likely that, depending on circumstances,
some archetypes come to the fore and affect conscious life more strongly than others.
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Kanji as Archetypal Images (see Appendix B)
Chinese characters (kanji) originated as a semiotic system independent from the
spoken language and, as such, they were used to divine the future as part of the religious
practices and rituals of the late Yin kingdom (BC 1300 – BC 1000) (Atsuji, 1989). These
symbols/signs were adopted as a writing system in the Chinese language and later in the
Japanese language where they are presently used as a component of a mixed system of
writing together with two syllabaries (hiragana and katakana), sets of characters which write
the smallest segment of language in Japanese – the mora. However, Japanese kanji function
non-phonetically (Sotirova, 1997; Chen, Yamauchi, Tamaoka & Vaid, 2007) in the system of
language and contribute to a slightly different structure of the linguistic sign as a graphic
image (Sotirova, 1997). There is right-hemispheric advantage for kanji and left-hemispheric
advantage for kana (hiragana and katakana) processing (Morikawa, 1981; Yamaguchi,
Toyoda, Xu, Kobayashi, & Henik, 2002) in the case of Japanese speakers. This fact suggests
that kanji are linked to visual schemas or archetypal images. Kanji reading is said to more
heavily involve visual orthographic retrieval and lexical-semantic system via the ventral route,
while kana transcriptions of kanji words require phonological recoding to gain semantic
access through the dorsal route (Thuy et al, 2004).
Considering the circumstances of the origination of Chinese characters, as well as the
peculiarity of their mode of cognitive processing as part of the system of Japanese language,
Sotirova-Kohli et al. (2011) theorized that Chinese characters might represent symbolic
archetypal images and we sought to test this premise empirically.
Our study built on the above described Rosen & Smith (1991) paradigm for studying
archetypal (collective unconscious) memory. We conducted a series of three experiments to
test the hypothesis that kanji are archetypal images. Experiments 1 and 2 were studies based
on the original research of Rosen et al. (1991), to test if there is any conscious / cultural
knowledge of the correct meaning of the 40 Chinese characters which would facilitate
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learning and recall of the characters. Experiment 3 (the main study) was designed to test if
showing characters matched with the correct meaning would have an effect on learning and
recall. In all three experiments we used the same set of 40 characters written in Tensho style.
Experiment 1 was a free association task. Twenty-nine randomly assigned
undergraduate students of psychology were shown the 40 characters for 20 seconds and, in
this time, were asked to come up with a word that best represented the image. Only three
characters were recognized correctly out of 1080 (40x27) possible correct answers. The
results revealed little if any conscious knowledge of the characters.
Experiment 2 was a forced association task. Twenty-nine, different, randomly
assigned undergraduate students in psychology were given the forty characters and a list of
eighty words – forty correct meanings of the characters and forty incorrect meanings, and
were asked to choose from the list the word that in their opinion best represented the meaning
of the respective image. Twenty-six characters were recognized correctly out of 1160 (40x29)
possible correct answers. Analysis demonstrated that participants were poorer than expected
by chance at matching characters with their correct meaning (Sotirova-Kohli et al., 2011). The
results confirmed that the participants have no conscious knowledge of the meaning of the
characters.
Experiment 3 was a paired-associate learning task. We hypothesized that if kanji
characters, like archetypal images (Rosen et al., 1991), were matched with their correct
meanings, these correctly matched pairs would have a higher rate of learning and recollection
than characters paired with incorrect meanings. Two different groups of randomly assigned
introductory psychology students at Texas A&M University (a total of 192) took part in the
study. The set of forty Chinese characters was divided into two sets, each consisting of twenty
characters. Each of the two groups of students was presented with both sets of characters;
however, in each group a different set was matched correctly with the meaning – word. The
students were shown first the character-word pairs for five seconds and, after a rest of one
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minute, they were shown only the characters for eight seconds each and asked to write down
the word they saw previously paired with the character.
The results were scored strictly. Only words which were the same as the presented
stimuli words were counted in the process of scoring (i.e., synonyms were not accepted as
correct answers). A repeated-measures factorial ANOVA with one within-subjects variable
(matching- matched vs mismatched) and one between-subjects variable (counterbalancing)
was conducted to analyze the data. The main effect of matching was significant, F (1, 168) =
12.986, p < .001; i.e., significantly more meanings were recalled for matched pairs than for
mismatched pairs. Matching Chinese characters with their correct meanings at the time of
study benefitted learning and subsequent recall. This result mirrors the results of Rosen et al.
(1991), and supports the idea that kanji characters are associated with their correct meanings;
such pre-existing knowledge makes paired associates easier to learn and recall, as compared
to paired associates that are not meaningfully paired (as already pointed out e.g., Thomson &
Tulving, 1970). Given the results of experiments 1 and 2, it appears that this pre-existing
knowledge of kanjis’ meanings is unconscious.
The results from Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 demonstrated that there was little or
no spontaneous conscious knowledge of the meaning of the Chinese characters. The results
from the main study (Experiment 3) lend weight to the hypothesis that there is unconscious
knowledge of the Chinese characters and their meanings that is triggered as a result of
priming when subjects are shown correctly-matched pairs of characters and their meanings.
The results from our study are similar to the previous studies of collective unconscious
(archetypal) memory of Rosen et al. (1991), Huston (1992) and Huston et al., (1999). We can
say that kanji, in a certain sense, behave on a cognitive level in a similar fashion to archetypal
symbols. These findings are encouraging in that they reaffirm the possibility of empirical
study, the existence of collective unconscious (archetypal) memory, and reinforce the
proposed connection between the archetype and its cognitive semantic nature as image
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schema (Knox, 2003). Although our experiments were not designed to test whether Chinese
characters are metaphoric extensions of image schemas, embodied cognition seems to be
another possible explanation of the observed results. As we pointed out earlier, kanji as visual
images were developed following certain systematic rules which were supposed to enable
these images to encode the signified of the linguistic sign independent of, but in a fashion
similar to the phonetic image/signifier, i.e., they encode the same content but independent
from the phonetic signifiers/sound images of the words and do not function phonetically. One
of the key assertions of cognitive semantics is that image schemas underlie thought and
language. As pointed out above, they are considered to be neuronal activation maps,
“experiential gestalts which momentarily emerge from ongoing brain, body and world
interactions” (Gibbs, 2005, p.115) and can be “turned on” by either performing an action or
having an actual experience, observing this experience or action, or thinking, speaking,
reading, or writing about it. Thus, image-schematic thought and linguistic processes involve
embodied simulation of experience using one’s body (Ibid.). Research demonstrated that
activation of certain image schematic spatial or temporal relations affects linguistic
comprehension, human actions and memory (Hampe, 2005). In particular, Raymond Gibbs
(2005), quoting the work of Richardson et al (2003), argued that participants had better
memory of pictures presented after a verbal stimuli when the pictures and the verbal stimuli
were oriented along the same spatial axis. Further Gibbs concluded that “verb comprehension
appears to activate image schemas that act as scaffolds for visual memory of the pictures”
(Ibid., pp. 121 - 122). Although the particular studies quoted by Gibbs to demonstrate the
effect that verbal stimuli can have on memory of pictures, depending on the image schematic
congruence between the two, concern verbs, there is a multitude of other evidence which
demonstrate that whether a verbal stimuli and a picture present congruent image schematic
relations of events or not affects learning and speed of subsequent recognition (Hampe, 2005).
Therefore, we can hypothesize that one possibility to explain the results from our study is that
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both kanji or visual stimuli and their archetypal meanings – verbal stimuli recruit similar
image schematic internal maps which facilitates learning and recall of the symbols matched
with their correct (archetypal) meaning. However, future research is needed to empirically
demonstrate the validity of these theoretical speculations, as well as the assertions that
archetypes are what cognitive semantics call image schemas.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
Conclusions
On the basis of the above theoretical analysis of findings in psychology and the
findings of our experimental investigations, as well as the previous research which tested
directly the archetype hypothesis of C. G. Jung, there is ground to say that the theory of the
archetypes seems to find support and that there is empirical evidence for the existence of
psychic archetypal structures. Different aspects of the archetype theory are supported by
findings in neuroscience, developmental psychology, systems theory, and cognitive
psychology as argued above. However, much further empirical research is necessary to
determine the psychological nature of the archetypes.
Our empirical investigations reaffirm in the first place the possible empirical study of
the hypothesis of collective unconscious. They confirmed the findings of the existence of
collective unconscious (archetypal) memory. The cross-cultural investigations of the
associations between archetypal symbols and their related meanings reported in this work
replicated the findings from the original US study (Rosen et al., 1991) and demonstrated that
there was a highly significant effect of matching on learning and subsequent recall of words
presented in the learning phase correctly matched with the archetypal symbols whose
meanings they represented. These results support the hypothesis that archetypal symbols in
the collective unconscious and their meanings are truly associated. The fact that most of the
participants indicated that they were not familiar with any of the symbol-word pairs before the
experiment also supports the hypothesis that there is no conscious awareness of the
associations between symbols and their related meanings. Furthermore, our results speak in
favor of the universality of the archetype proposed by C. G. Jung and suggest that the
observed effects in the studies is not likely to be explained as a result of cultural influence or
a linguistic artifact.
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The empirical investigations of Chinese characters (kanji) as archetypal images
demonstrated that Chinese characters trigger within the system of language
unconscious/implicit knowledge of meanings similar to archetypal symbols. The nature of
Japanese language allows, in this respect, consciousness of contents of the archetypal level
independent from the phonetic signifiers of language by means of the graphic representation
of the concepts in language. The results we observed reinforce the proposed connection
between the archetype and its cognitive semantic nature as image schema (Knox, 2003).
Although our experiments were not designed to test whether Chinese characters are
metaphoric extensions of image schemas, embodied cognition seems to be another possible
explanation of the observed results. Furthermore, even though proponents of the theory of
embodied cognition argue that concepts in alphabetical languages are metaphoric extensions
of image schemas as well, we can argue that including a graphic image with archetypal
qualities as equal to the phonetic image of the word contributes to a different pattern of
encoding and representation of information in the mind as consciousness.
Future Directions
The results from our investigations demonstrated that there is a strong association
between archetypal symbols and their related meanings which is implicit in nature and can be
triggered in consciousness through an effect of priming. The cross-cultural investigations
supported the hypothesis that the results observed in the original English study of the
associations between archetypal symbols and their meanings, cannot simply be explained as a
cultural or linguistic artifact. These first investigations demonstrated as well the possibility to
test hypotheses from analytical psychology experimentally.
These were, however, first steps in establishing an empirically based theory of the
archetype and the collective unconscious. There are still many questions open for future
research.
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Among these we can mention the need of further cross-cultural studies of the
associations between archetypal symbols and their meanings in other language families (e.g.
Chinese, Japanese, Russian, etc.), as well as in different populations: different age groups
(elderly, children) or also in groups of clinical populations such as amnesic patients.
It is highly intriguing to test empirically the proposed multiple new reformulations of
the archetype theory and in particular the view that the archetype can be understood in terms
of image schemas and embodiment.
Furthermore, it would be a natural development of the Rosen and Smith paradigm
(1991) to develop a Symbol Association Test procedure using the ASI and to study the
associations of people with its help. Comparing the results of a Symbol Association Test to
the work with the Word Association Test can shed light on the mechanisms and memory
systems involved in cognitive processing when a complex is activated, as well as on the
cognitive nature of complexes and archetypes. In this respect, it would be particularly
interesting to conduct fMRI studies of participants involved in a Symbol Association Test and
compare the observed activation patterns with the findings of Bechtel (2013) from his study
of the neuronal activation patterns underlying the activation of a complex in participants
involved in taking the Word Association Test.
Conducting fMRI studies of participants involved in making the paired-associates
learning task from the main experiment in Rosen and Smith’s paradigm could provide
evidence for or against the neuronal mechanism at work in triggering archetypal associations
proposed by Huston, Rosen and Smith (1999). Such studies can help to understand what
processes are related to the complexes and the archetypal associations through providing
evidence of the neuronal activation patterns which correlate with the cognitive functions
involved in fulfilling the respective tasks.
The investigations in relation to Chinese characters as archetypal symbols can be
enriched through conducting cross-cultural replications with Chinese- and Japanese-speaking
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native speakers, as well as in samples of children. To test the effect of the written form on the
strength of association between graphic image and meaning, different written styles of the
Chinese characters could be used in the experiment instead of the Tensho style forms used in
our study. Furthermore, in addition to the pairs of Chinese characters and their English
translation word, pairs of the respective Japanese words written in the syllabaries (instead of
in kanji) and the English translations can be added to the paired associates used in the main
study to test whether the strong associations observed in our study were really due to the
archetypal nature of the Chinese characters. It would be particularly interesting to test if there
would be a different degree of strength of association between the Chinese character and its
meaning depending on the category of graphic image as defined by the system of Rikusho
that was used in the experiment.
In conclusion, the empirical investigations reported here tested Jung’s hypothesis of
the archetypes of the collective unconscious and provided evidence in its support. Theoretical
considerations of the nature of the archetype as proposed by Jung and findings in
contemporary psychology and neuroscience demonstrated that Jung’s ideas find support in
many developments of mainstream academic psychology today. However, much further
research is necessary to be able to draw empirically based conclusions about the
psychological nature of the archetypes and to demonstrate the mechanisms at work related to
the archetypes.
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